Here is the honest situation. Here is the honest situation. You increasingly have to run code you do not trust, customer scripts, third party plugins, hostile file parsers, AI-generated programs, and the everyday sandbox is a container, which is a process on the host's shared kernel, not a box. The kernel is the boundary an attacker inside pushes on, and a container escape is what happens when they push through it to the host. You cannot make that risk vanish by trusting a default runtime, and you cannot wave it through without eventually explaining a host or cluster compromise. Containing it is an engineering discipline, harden the shared-kernel layers, drive misconfigurations to zero, choose the boundary strength honestly, watch runtime behavior, and bound the blast radius so a breach is confined.
This Kit removes the guesswork. It is untrusted-code containment written as adopt-ready controls, so a sandbox is hardened, its boundary is matched to the threat, its misconfigurations are closed, and its breach is contained, on the record, rather than assumed safe because the container started.
What you get, the moment you buy
Grounded in real Linux container and kernel isolation practice, including namespaces and cgroups, Linux capabilities and capability dropping, rootless and user namespaces, seccomp-bpf syscall filtering, AppArmor and SELinux mandatory access control, the container escape classes, gVisor, Kata Containers and Firecracker microVMs, network segmentation and egress control, Falco, eBPF and auditd runtime monitoring, and air-gapped, blast-radius-limited incident response.
What one control looks like
This is the opening control, where the containment architecture begins. All 18 are built to this depth.
Why this is not another template pack
- The boundary is the point. A shared kernel is the surface an escape attacks, so the design has to name what each layer counters and decide honestly when hardened containers are enough and when the code needs a gVisor, Kata or Firecracker boundary. This tells you how, for every control.
- The escape classes built in. Kernel vulnerabilities, over-broad mounts, an exposed runtime socket, privileged containers, exposed /proc and /sys, capability dropping, rootless, seccomp and mandatory access control, segmentation and egress, runtime detection and air-gapped response are written into the controls, not left generic.
- Built on real mechanisms, not one runtime. The controls are principle-level, so they hold across container runtimes, orchestrators and boundary technologies, and stay useful as isolation tooling evolves.
Who buys this
Security architects and DevSecOps engineers responsible for isolating high-risk and untrusted workloads.
Common questions
Is it really editable? Yes. Word and Excel files you own and adapt. No portal, no subscription.
Does it cover the whole containment method? Yes. The containment architecture and boundary decision, kernel privilege reduction with capabilities and rootless, syscall and mandatory access control confinement, mount hygiene and misconfiguration prevention, network segmentation and egress control, and runtime detection and air-gapped incident response each have their own controls with their own evidence.
Is this tied to one container runtime or boundary technology? No. The controls are principle-level, dropped capabilities, rootless, seccomp-bpf, mandatory access control, mount hygiene, segmentation, and a boundary decision, so they apply across container runtimes and across gVisor, Kata Containers and Firecracker.
Who is it for? Security architects and DevSecOps engineers who must isolate untrusted, high-risk workloads and defend the containment to a security review and an auditor.
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